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Introduction
Inequity in health care has recently become one of the most pertinent and relevant issues in health economics and health policy. Much research on methodology and international comparisons has been carried out by Wagstaff et al. (1989 Wagstaff et al. ( , 1991 , Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff (1992) , Van Doorslaer (1993, 1994) , Van Doorslaer et al. (1997 , 2000 , and Kakwani et al. (1997) . In particular, research on horizontal inequity has been undertaken by Van Doorslaer et al. (2000) and, most recently, by Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) .
Eleven OECD countries have been studied on the basis of reasonably comparable definitions of health inequity. Unfortunately, Japan has not been included in previous studies. While Ohkusa and Honda (2003a) use the Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions for Japan (CSLC), this survey only reports whether individuals are currently visiting a doctor, rather than the frequency of visits to a doctor or hospitalization during the previous year, as surveys for other OECD countries do. Unfortunately, no national survey contains both this information and other socio-demographic information. Hence, an original survey is needed.
Mainly due to financial limitations, the sample size of our original survey was far less than that of a national survey. However, it may still be representative even though it uses two-stage strata, as does the CSLC. Our survey supplements the CSLC and is comparable with those for other countries.
We performed the survey in March of 2002 and 2003, and we obtained about 3,000 observations. There were various reasons why we could not complete the survey in one phase. The most important reason was financial difficulty. We had funds to survey about 1,500 individuals in one year but it was insufficient to survey 3,000 individuals. Fortunately, the funding was available in the succeeding year and thus we could survey over two years. The second reason was related to some concerns about bias due to the small sample. Of course, we analyzed the 2002 data of our original survey (Ohkusa and Honda 2003b) , but some problems seemed to remain, which might have been due to the small sample or other survey procedures. To overcome the small sample or other problems, we needed a more appropriate survey once again. The third reason concerns the definition of variables that indicate inpatient utilization. In the 2002 survey, we had surveyed only inpatient utilization in a lifetime until the year of the survey or within a year. However, in other OECD countries, the number of hospitalized days is also surveyed and analyzed. Hence, we added some questions about hospitalized days in the 2003 survey.
Before considering the measurement of health care, the institutional background in Japan is summarized. In 1961, Japan completed the introduction of compulsory public health insurance with coverage for all residents. In 1997, a new law was introduced requiring coinsurance rates of 20% for the employed and 30% for others, such as the self-employed and dependents. For people over 70 years of age, out-of-pocket payments (OPP) are limited to approximately 4000 yen (about US$36 in 2001 prices) per month. However, large firms sometimes subsidize their employees by reducing their co-payments to less than the legal requirement. Medical services are provided as welfare to very poor people who cannot afford to pay the premiums. Thus, everybody can access medical services in Japan.
The public health insurance system provides reimbursement on a fee-forservice (FFS) basis. Although the government regulates the price of treatment and drugs almost every year, it cannot directly control the choice of treatment and/or drugs, unlike the Utilization Review at Managed Care. Unlike the National Health Service (NHS) and Sickness Fund, the insurer cannot control the budget ex ante.
There is no regulation of the medical services chosen by patients, as undertaken by the gatekeeper in the NHS, or different coverage as in the HMO. In other words, there is no practical difference between general practitioners and specialists. The coinsurance rate is the same for services provided in hospitals and clinics (either public or private), but congestion may implicitly impose an opportunity cost. The number of beds is strictly regulated, but provision of outpatient services is virtually unregulated.
Private insurance plays only a minor role because public insurance has such a comprehensive coverage of medical services. Shigeno (2000) shows that private insurance appears to complement public insurance only through its income effect.
Hence, private insurance in Japan is very different from that in the USA and European countries, which is why Japan is usually excluded from international comparisons in health economics. These households voluntarily contracted with the firm that conducted the survey to complete the various surveys. The households surveyed were randomly sampled by two-stage strata, but decisions to cooperate were deliberate. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to the sampling bias that can arise from this type of sampling. In fact, the survey has no unemployed and few self-employed respondents, and there is a slight bias towards richer households.
Data
However, this bias could be controlled for by appropriately weighting informa-tion. Hence, not only are subsequent regression results weighted by income and by region, so are the summary statistics. The sample excludes institutionalized individuals.
Unfortunately, even after combining the two years, our sample of 3,046 respondents is the smallest used for a health care inequity study for any OECD country. The second smallest is a sample of 3,374 respondents for Sweden used by Van Doorslaer et al. (2000) . Other countries for which sample sizes of less than 4,000 have been used are East Germany (3, 844) and Denmark (3, 955) . These were conducted in the early 1990s and so could be updated. Although comparable, our data set for Japan is much smaller than the surveys for other OECD countries. This is due primarily to financial problems, which cannot be fixed in the short term. Therefore, we have to use our small data set to analyze health care inequity in Japan, even though smaller samples may lead to bias. OPP is defined at the household level. Note that because the questionnaire defines OPP as payment for medication, it is not limited to co-payments for medical services, but also includes non-prescribed drugs and other medical services that are not covered by public health insurance. Thus, we assume that its mode in each category is the number. Since the highest category is open-ended, we use the same interval as in the second highest category. Income is also measured at the household level in nine categories. Hence, we make the same adjustment as for OPP. Moreover, income is adjusted to household structure as follows.
Adjusted Income = Income (Number of Adults + 0.5 Number of Children) 0.75 (1) where children are less than 16 years old. Chronic disease is represented by a dummy variable that indicates whether individuals suffered from symptoms even if they were not currently visiting a doctor.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1 
The Measurement of Horizontal Inequity
In measuring horizontal inequity, three aspects need to be clarified: the definition of demand for medical care; the definition of needs; and the estimation methods.
The definitions and estimation methods used in this paper are described below.
Social and economic conditions are defined individually by household disposable income per equivalent adult, as in previous studies. Since OPP is a continuous variable, we estimate a linear model for the log of OPP. Since OPP is a household-level variable, we cannot use individual effects.
Definition of Needs
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Estimation Method
First, the Concentration Index for medical care or needs is defined following Kakwani et al. (1997) :
where µ i is the demand for medical care, µ is the average of µ i over persons, R i is the cumulative proportion up to the ith person in order of income adjusted for household structure, and σ 2 R is its variance. The estimated α 1 is the Concentration Index of the demand for medical care. Similarly, the Concentration Index of needs is defined by replacing µ by n, which is a measure of needs.
Following Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) , the variance of the Concentration Index is adjusted as follows:
The horizontal inequity measure is obtained by using the following estimation method:
The estimated coefficient of β 1 is interpreted as horizontal inequity ( 
Empirical Results
The first panel in Table 2 shows the empirical results for "Needs". Note that these numbers are the estimated coefficients and not the marginal effects, and hence they cannot be interpreted directly. It is apparent that SAH and age significantly affect outpatient utilization, but may not affect inpatient utilization and OPP.
Overall, Wald tests and F tests indicate a good fit. Table 3 indicates the distribution of actual "Needs", while predicted "Needs" are shown in Table 2 . Actual utilization is higher in the highest and the lowest income groups, but this is not the case in the predicted Needs. Overall, predicted
Needs do not seem to reflect income classes, except for the highest income class.
The Concentration Index, which measures inequality in utilization, is summarized in the first and third rows of Table 4 . Clearly, these numbers indicate no inequality in utilization in terms of the number of outpatients or inpatient days.
However, there are some progressive cases in the yes/no indicator of outpatient service or inpatient utilization in the lifetime. Moreover, the Index suggests evidence of progressiveness in OPP. In other words, the rich have tended to spend more than the poor do. However, since "Needs" have not been taken into account, we cannot discuss inequity. Table 4 . These properties are unchanged if year and/or prefecture dummies are added as explanatory variables in equation (3).
Next, we move to the Kakwani Index, which is the Concentration Index above To confirm and test the impression given by the Figures, we undertake empirical investigations. The bottom row of Table 4 summarizes the empirical results for β 1 in equation (5), and the lower panel summarizes horizontal inequity adjusted for regions.
As the results indicate, the null hypothesis of no inequity cannot be rejected for the number of outpatients and the number of days of inpatient utilization.
However, for the yes/no indicator of outpatients and inpatient utilization in the lifetime or OPP, the results indicate pro-rich inequity, as suggested by the figures.
In addition, in the case of no year or regional dummies, inpatient utilization in the previous year indicates pro-rich inequity, even though it does not indicate any inequality in Table 4 . Conversely, the Kakwani Index of OPP without year and regional dummies indicates inequity, but when we add a year dummy into equation (5), the index is significantly positive. This may reflect the changing measurement in the two survey years. With regional dummies, the magnitudes are 0.014, 0.028 and 0.082 for outpatients, inpatient in a lifetime and OPP respectively. Without regional dummies, the corresponding magnitudes are 0.020, 0.037 and 0.074. The Kakwani Index of inpatient utilization in the previous year without year or regional dummies is 0.08, which is very high compared to OPP.
Concluding Remarks
We found that the hypothesis that there is no inequity cannot be rejected, and . Thus, Japan has the greatest most pro-poor inequity.
However, the Kakwani Index is not significant in Japan. As Belgium and the UK have significant pro-poor inequity, the extent of pro-poor inequity in Japan is behind these countries in the statistical sense.
From this study, we can learn about the huge differences between the yes/no indicator and the number of utilization days. The yes/no indicator in outpatient service always indicated pro-rich inequity, but utilization in terms of the number of outpatients never showed significant inequity. Moreover, yes/no indicators of inpatient utilization sometimes showed pro-rich inequity, but the number of days of inpatient utilization did not. Therefore, our previous research result (Ohkusa and Honda 2003a), which reported pro-rich inequity before 1997, but equity in 1998 in the yes/no indicator of outpatients, might be misleading for horizontal inequity in Japan. We cannot reconsider this result as we did not perform a survey like the one in this study before 1998. Nevertheless, we have to check the robustness of the result obtained in this research. This remains a topic for future study. They represent utilization as total visits to a physician and incorporate regional information.
2) The eight OECD countries are from Van Doorslaer et al. (2000) in the case of inequity adjusted by age, sex, SAH, and a dummy for chronic illness.
For purposes of comparison, we adopt estimated inequity without regional dummies. 
Table1: Summary Statistics

